SCOOTER L. ROBINSON A/K/A SCOOTER LYNN ROBINSON A/K/A SCOOTER ROBINSON, APPELLANT
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, APPELLEE
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PEARL RIVER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/27/2014. TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ANTHONY ALAN MOZINGO. TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF DISMISSED.
FOR APPELLANT: SCOOTER L. ROBINSON (Pro se).
FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS.
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND JAMES, JJ. LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, MAXWELL, FAIR, AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
[¶1] On July 13, 2009, Scooter Robinson pleaded guilty to possession of a precursor chemical, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and felony fleeing. He was sentenced to a combined thirty-five years, with eleven years to serve. The circuit court entered a final judgment of conviction and sentenced Robinson on July 24, 2009.
[¶2] Robinson filed a motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCCR) on April 2, 2014. In his PCCR motion, Robinson alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, due-process-rights violations, and cumulative error.
[¶3] The circuit court dismissed Robinson's PCCR motion on June 2, 2014. The
court found the motion to be time-barred under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 2014). The court further ruled that Robinson failed to meet any exception to the procedural bar. It is from this denial that Robinson now appeals.
[¶4] This Court will not overturn a trial court's dismissal of a PCCR motion on appeal " unless the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous." Chapman v. State, 135 So.3d 184, 185 (¶ 6) (Miss. Ct.App. 2013) (citation omitted). " When reviewing questions of law, this Court's standard of review is de novo." Id. (citation omitted).
[¶5] We begin with the time-bar of section 99-39-5(2), which requires a petitioner who pleads guilty to file a PCCR motion within three years from the date of judgment of conviction. Robinson entered a guilty plea on July 13, 2009, and the circuit court entered a judgment of conviction on July 24, 2009. This gave Robinson until July 24, 2012, to file a PCCR motion, but Robinson did not file his PCCR motion until April 2, 2014. Accordingly, we find that the time-bar in section 99-39-5(2) applies.
[¶6] We must next determine whether an exception to this time-bar applies. " Section 99-39-5(2)(a)-(b) exempts from the time-bar cases in which the movant can demonstrate new evidence not available at trial, an intervening higher-court decision, or that the movant is being detained on an expired sentence." Blount ...