United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division
ANGELA CAMERON, AS THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ANTHONY CAMERON, DECEASED, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF HERSELF, AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER PARTIES ENTITLED TO RECOVER FOR THE WRONGFUL DEATH OF ANTHONY CAMERON, Plaintiffs,
WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC., A FOREIGN CORPORATION, AND TERRY J. GUILLORY, AN INDIVIDUAL, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KEITH STARRETT, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment  of the Defendants Werner Enterprises, Inc. ("Werner") and Terry J. Guillory ("Guillory"). Having considered the submissions of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion is not well taken and should be denied.
This wrongful death action arises out of a commercial vehicle accident that occurred on December 3, 2012, in Perry County, Mississippi. The decedent, Anthony Cameron, was the driver of one of the vehicles involved in the accident. Guillory was the driver of the other vehicle. Guillory was acting within the course and scope of his employment with Werner at the time of the accident.
On November 1, 2013, Angela Cameron (as the Administratrix of the Estate of Anthony Cameron, on behalf of herself, and on behalf of all other parties entitled to recover for the wrongful death of Anthony Cameron) filed suit against Werner and Guillory in this Court. ( See Compl. .) Angela Cameron was Anthony Cameron's wife at the time of his death. The Complaint asserts allegations of negligence and gross negligence, and requests compensatory damages, punitive damages, interest, attorney's fees, and costs. Subject matter jurisdiction is asserted on the basis of diversity of citizenship pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Plaintiff Abigail Cameron ("Abigail") is the adult daughter of the decedent, but not Angela Cameron. Anthony Cameron fathered Abigail during his prior marriage to Kelly Rigel. Abigail was twenty-five (25) years old at the time of Anthony Cameron's death. Via the subject motion, Defendants seek summary judgment on Abigail's claim for loss of society and companionship. The motion has been fully briefed and the Court is ready to rule.
A. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). "Where the burden of production at trial ultimately rests on the nonmovant, the movant must merely demonstrate an absence of evidentiary support in the record for the nonmovant's case." Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmovant must then "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. "An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Daniels v. City of Arlington, Tex., 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001)). "An issue is genuine' if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 812 (citation omitted).
The Court is not permitted to make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007)). When deciding whether a genuine fact issue exists, "the court must view the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Sierra Club, Inc., 627 F.3d at 138. However, "[c]onclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is mandatory "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Brown v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 663 F.3d 759, 766 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
Defendants argue that Abigail's claim for loss of society and companionship fails as a matter of law because she had no relationship with the decedent for over twenty-two (22) years preceding his death. Defendants focus on the following circumstances in support of this argument. Abigail lived with her mother and the decedent in Hattiesburg, Mississippi for approximately three years. After Abigail's mother and Anthony Cameron divorced, Abigail moved to Greenville, Mississippi and then to Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Abigail lived with her mother and step-father, James Brandt, in Greenville and Fort Lauderdale. Abigail believed that her step-father was her biological father, and she did not find out that Anthony Cameron was her biological father until she was approximately thirteen years old. Abigail's mother told her that she left the decedent because he had been physically abusive to Abigail when she was very young. Abigail never received any communications from Anthony Cameron, and he never received any communications from her. Abigail was not aware of Anthony Cameron's death until a private investigator informed her of this circumstance. Abigail was approximately three years old the last time she ever saw or was with Anthony Cameron.
Abigail argues that the issue of damages for loss of society and companionship is for the jury to determine at trial. Abigail primarily relies on the following particulars in opposition to summary judgment. Abigail initially lived with Anthony Cameron and her mother in Hattiesburg. She possesses hundreds of photographs of the three of them together from that period of time. After Abigail learned that the decedent was her father when she was around thirteen, she ...