VICTOR D. JONES A/K/A VICTOR DEWAYNE JONES A/K/A VICTOR JONES, APPELLANT
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/02/2013.
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PIKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, HON. DAVID H. STRONG JR,
VICTOR D. JONES, APPELLANT, Pro se.
FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER.
BEFORE IRVING, P.J., ROBERTS AND MAXWELL, JJ. LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., ISHEE, CARLTON, MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
[¶1] We are presented, once again, with reviewing the Pike County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of Victor D. Jones's motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), which attacked his 2004 guilty pleas to two counts of sexual battery. We affirm and find that the circuit court properly summarily dismissed Jones's PCR motion, as it was time-barred and successive-writ barred.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶2] As this is Jones's third PCR motion, the underlying facts have been detailed in our prior opinions and the Mississippi Supreme Court's opinion. See Jones v. State, 119 So.3d 323 (Miss. 2013) ( Jones II-MSSC ); Jones v. State, 119 So.3d 350 (Miss. Ct.App. 2013) (reversed in part) ( Jones II-COA ); and Jones v. State, 962 So.2d 571 (Miss. Ct.App. 2006) ( Jones I ). According to Jones's PCR motion, he pled guilty to two counts of sexual battery, with a plea recommendation of twenty years, ten years to serve and the remainder on probation and/or post-release supervision.
The late Judge Mike Smith did not accept the State's recommendation and sentenced Jones to twenty years, on each count, to be served in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. His sentences were ordered to run consecutively.
[¶3] Jones filed his first PCR motion on December 29, 2004, alleging that his indictment was faulty, he received ineffective assistance of counsel, his guilty pleas were not voluntary, and he was prejudiced by not having appointed counsel prior to his indictment; but the circuit court summarily dismissed his PCR motion. Jones I, 962 So.2d at 572 (¶ 2). On appeal, this Court affirmed the circuit court's summary dismissal. Id. at (¶ 3). We further found that " Jones's plea[s were] voluntary and that he received effective assistance of counsel." Id. at 573 (¶ 6). The mandate issued.
[¶4] Jones's next PCR motion was filed on April 11, 2011, and the circuit court again summarily dismissed the PCR motion, finding it was " procedurally barred as a successive writ, and is time-barred." Jones II-COA, 119 So.3d at 351 (¶ 5). On appeal of that summary dismissal, Jones argued that the circuit court erred in finding that his PCR motion was time-barred and successive-writ barred because he had alleged his sentence was illegal, and because he should have had a mental-health evaluation before he was permitted to enter his guilty pleas. Id. at (¶ 2). He further disputed the circuit court's finding that it lacked jurisdiction on the case because Jones had not sought permission from the supreme court to file his PCR motion. Id. This Court again affirmed the circuit court's summary dismissal of Jones's PCR motion. Id. at 352 (¶ 13). This Court held in Jones II-COA that the circuit court properly applied the procedural bars because Jones's sentence was within the parameters of a legal sentence for the crime of sexual battery, and that Jones failed to explain how his sentence was otherwise illegal. Id. at 351-52 (¶ 9). We also found that Jones's argument that he should have been given a mental evaluation prior to entering his guilty pleas was not raised in his prior PCR motion and the claim of mental incompetence is not excepted from the procedural bars. Id. at 352 (¶ 10). Further, we recognized in our prior opinion that " Jones's guilty plea was voluntarily made." Id. This Court also affirmed the circuit court's finding that it lacked jurisdiction because Jones failed to seek permission to file his PCR motion from the supreme court as required by statute. Id. at (¶ 12).
[¶5] Jones requested certiorari review of this Court's decision, and the supreme court granted it. In Jones II-MSSC, 119 So.3d at 326 (¶ 9), the supreme court reversed on the issue of whether Jones had to seek its permission before filing his PCR motion. Otherwise, it affirmed " the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the PCR motion is time-barred and also . . . that the motion is barred based on res judicata." Id.
[¶6] Then, on August 30, 2013, Jones filed the PCR motion at the center of this case. He again argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that his plea was involuntary, that his due-process rights were violated by not receiving a competency hearing, that he was incompetent when he was coerced into pleading guilty, that he did not get to inspect the State's discovery materials, and that his plea agreement was ...