United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KEITH STARRETT, District Judge.
For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration . Defendant's Motion in Limine  and Motion to Strike  are denied as moot. The pretrial conference scheduled for Monday, December 1, 2014, is cancelled. The Court will enter a separate judgment.
This case involves claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant called him at his place of employment after it knew or had reason to know that Plaintiff was not permitted to receive such calls, violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(a)(3) and 1692d. The Court previously denied  Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment , see Wells v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 2:13-CV-256-KS-MTP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149395 (S.D.Miss. Oct. 20, 2014), and it now considers Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration .
"A motion asking the court to reconsider a prior ruling is evaluated either as a motion... under Rule 59(e) or... under Rule 60(b). The rule under which the motion is considered is based on when the motion is filed. If the motion is filed within twenty-eight days after the entry of judgment, the motion is treated as though it was filed under Rule 59, and if it was filed outside of that time, it is analyzed under Rule 60." Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (5th Cir. 2012). Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration  was filed within twenty-eight days of the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order  of October 20, 2014, and Rule 59(e) applies.
"A Rule 59(e) motion calls into question the correctness of a judgment." Templet v. Hydrochem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2004). "[S]uch a motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment. Rather, Rule 59(e) serves the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Id. It is "an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly." Id.
Defendant offers two arguments. First, it argues that the Court misapprehended the evidence and, as a result, mistakenly denied its motion for summary judgment. Second, it argues that the Court erred by deeming Plaintiff's interrogatory responses sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. It is only necessary for the Court to address Defendant's first argument.
A. The Magistrate Judge's Order
Before the Court proceeds, it must clarify a key issue. The Magistrate Judge previously held:
... Plaintiff will not be permitted to present evidence of any calls from defendant unless those calls were disclosed in his interrogatory responses provided after the court's order  of July 17, 2014. Plaintiff has agreed that the calls recorded by defendant are accurate. He may rely on those recorded calls to support his claims as well as the "Conversation on July 7 or July 8, 2014" and the "Conversation in August 2013" as described in his supplemental responses to interrogatory no. 4. As he has not disclosed the details for any other calls, he may not present evidence of other calls or rely on any other calls to support his claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii).
Order, Wells v. Healthcare Financial Services, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-356-KS-MTP (S.D.Miss. Aug. 12, 2014), ECF No. 92. Therefore, the undersigned judge previously noted that although Plaintiff alleges calls on many dates not specifically listed in the complaint, he would only be permitted to "rely on evidence of the calls recorded by Defendant; the alleged call on July 7 or 8, 2013; and the alleged call in late August 2013." Wells, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149395 at *7 n. 2.
To the extent the Court was previously unclear, it provides the following clarification: pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's sanctions order , Plaintiff may not rely on evidence of any calls other than the alleged call on July 7 or 8, 2013; the ...