United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Delta Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MICHAEL P. MILLS, District Judge.
Christopher Harvey, a federal prisoner at the time he initiated this action, is proceeding pro se on a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Government has submitted a response to the motion. This matter is ripe for review. Having considered the pleadings and the record, including the relevant parts of Harvey's underlying criminal case, along with the relevant law, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary, and that the motion should be denied.
Background Facts and Procedural History
Christopher Harvey, a/k/a "Toot, " was indicted on February 26, 2004, by a grand jury for the Northern District of Mississippi on several counts of possessing with intent to distribute a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(C). On June 2, 2004, Harvey pleaded guilty to Count Two of the indictment, which charged that he did, in the Northern District of Mississippi, knowingly distribute a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(C). Harvey was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 151 months.
Harvey timely appealed, arguing that the Court enhanced his sentence under United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.1 based on his career offender status in violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The Fifth Circuit vacated Harvey's sentence and remanded for resentencing. Resentencing proceedings were held, and on October 11, 2006, the Court entered an amended judgment, sentencing Harvey to a term of imprisonment of 151 months as to Count Two of the indictment, followed by three years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and ineligibility for all federal benefits for a period of 5 years ending October 8, 2009. (ECF No. 43).
Harvey filed the instant motion on May 10, 2012, asserting that the "Admiralty Court has convicted me without Subject-Matter of the action or the class of cases. By the use of fraud and deceit.") (ECF No. 44, 2). He subsequently filed a supplement on May 21, 2012, alleging that the "conviction was obtained by an... indictment that was not sufficient in law to charge a offense against the United States and failed to inform the petitioner of the nature of the accusation within [the] meaning of the VI Amendment[.]" (ECF No. 45).
There are four separate grounds upon which a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Collateral attack limits a movant's allegations to those of "constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude." United States v. Samuels, 59 F.3d 526, 528 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Relief under § 2255 is reserved, therefore, for violations of "constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised on direct appeal and, would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 1981).
A motion filed under § 2255 must comply with the statute's one-year period of limitation, which runs from the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by goovernmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through ...