COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/05/2011. TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JEFF WEILL SR. TRIAL COURT DISMISSED MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF.
RICHARD CHAPMAN, APPELLANT, Pro se.
FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, BY: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS.
BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND JAMES, JJ. LEE, C.J., IRVING, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON, MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
¶1. Richard Chapman appeals the dismissal of his motion for post-conviction collateral relief (" PCCR" ). The circuit court determined that Chapman's motion was time-barred under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 2013). In this appeal, Chapman contends that the dismissal was in error. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. In 1981, Chapman was indicted for committing the crimes of rape and armed robbery. He was convicted of rape on January 27, 1982, and he was sentenced to
life imprisonment. On September 22, 1982, Chapman pled guilty to robbery without a firearm and was sentenced to serve ten years in prison. Chapman did not appeal either conviction.
¶3. On December 27, 2006, Chapman filed a PCCR motion. In this motion, he argued: (1) his " actual innocence" in regard to his rape conviction; (2) the circuit court's failure to abide by Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court 8.04 when the court accepted his guilty plea; (3) the State's failure to preserve exculpatory evidence and his trial transcript; and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel. Chapman later amended the motion to add that: (1) his indictments in both the rape and robbery cases were defective; (2) the jury that convicted him of rape was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community; and (3) he is serving an " illegal sentence." The circuit court ruled that the motion was time-barred, under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2), and no exception was applicable. The court summarily dismissed the motion without an evidentiary hearing.
¶4. Chapman appealed the dismissal of his motion and raised numerous issues. See Chapman v. State, 47 So.3d 203, 204-05 (¶ 1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). However, this Court focused on the argument that the circuit court erred in the dismissal of his motion without consideration of the State's alleged destruction of exculpatory evidence and the court's failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 206 (¶ 7). This Court affirmed the dismissal of the motion and held that the motion was procedurally barred due to Chapman's failure to comply with the statutory requirements for the contents of a PCCR motion; that the motion was time-barred due to the three-year statute of limitations; and that there was no evidence of the State's bad faith destruction of exculpatory evidence. Chapman, 47 So.3d at 208-209 (¶ ¶ 17,20,23). His petition for certiorari was denied. Chapman v. State, 63 So.3d 1229 (Miss. 2011).
¶5. On August 1, 2011, Chapman filed a motion styled as both a " Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Conviction" and a " Motion for Post-Conviction Relief." In this motion, he included the same issues he argued in his first motion. The circuit court treated the motion as a PCCR motion, ...