Angela RIGDON a/k/a Angela Eugenia Rigdon a/k/a Angela E. Rigdon, Appellant
STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 2013.
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Angela Rigdon, appellant, pro se.
Office of the Attorney General by Ladonna C. Holland, attorney for appellee.
Before GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, MAXWELL and JAMES, JJ.
¶ 1. Angela Rigdon tried to attack two judgments in one motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), which the law does not permit. Further, we find it was plain from her motion, exhibits, and prior proceedings that she was not entitled to any relief. Thus, we affirm the circuit judge's summary dismissal of Rigdon's PCR motion.
¶ 2. In March 2007, Rigdon pled guilty to two separate crimes, charged in two separate causes— (1) the robbery of John Culpepper, and (2) the capital murder of Stuart Milam in the course of the underlying crime of robbery of Milam. Rigdon admitted participating in both robberies with co-indictee Robert Wayne Bounds, though she denied being the one who actually killed Milam. She was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment for the robbery conviction and to life in prison for the capital-murder conviction. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively.
¶ 3. Rigdon filed a pro se PCR motion. The docket lists Rigdon's PCR motion as having been filed on January 21, 2011— outside the three-year time limit. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Supp.2012) (requiring, in cases where petitioner plead guilty, that PCR motion be filed within three years of entry of judgment of conviction). But the file stamp that shows the PCR motion as filed on January 21, 2011, appears to have been later placed over an earlier file stamp dated March 25, 2010. And a handwritten 2010 cause number was apparently scratched out and replaced with a new 2011 cause number. Also, all signature dates throughout Rigdon's motion are from March 2010. So the record indicates Rigdon may have initially filed her PCR motion in March 2010, within the three years of the entry of her guilty plea. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2).
¶ 4. The possibility that Rigdon's motion may have been timely filed is bolstered by the fact the circuit judge did not summarily dismiss her motion based on section 99-39-5(2)'s time-bar. Instead, he summarily dismissed the PCR motion on a different procedural ground, since it impermissibly attacked more than one judgment. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-9(2) (Supp.2012) (limiting a PCR motion to the " to the assertion of a claim for relief against one (1) judgment only" ). The judge also found summary dismissal proper because Rigdon's motion plainly lacked merit. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Supp.2012) (" If it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief, the judge may make an order for its dismissal[.]" ).
¶ 5. After reviewing Rigdon's PCR motion, we affirm the summary dismissal for the same two reasons the circuit ...