MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE
GLEN H. DAVIDSON, Senior District Judge.
Presently before the Court are Defendant The Kroger Co.'s motion for judgment on the pleadings  and motion to strike . Upon due consideration, the Court finds that the motion for judgment on the pleadings  should be granted in part and denied in part, and the motion to strike  should be granted.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
From the evening of May 1, 2010 until the early morning hours of May 2, 2010, heavy rain pelted the Corinth, Mississippi area, causing nearby Elam Creek to flood. Plaintiff Kmart Corporation ("Kmart") alleges that due to the acts and omissions of several Defendants the flood water rose and flowed forcefully into the back of the Corinth Kmart store, rushing in the rear doors and causing extensive damage to the store. The Corinth Kmart store was closed for repairs from the time of the May 2010 flood until February 2011, when the store reopened for business. On April 27, 2011, Kmart alleges its Corinth store incurred additional costs to prevent subsequent damage from another anticipated flood event. Kmart brings this action against Defendants The Kroger Co. ("Kroger"); E & A Southeast limited Partnership; Fulton Improvements, LLC; Kansas City Southern Railway Company; and the City of Corinth. The Court will limit its analysis to Kmart's claims against Kroger, as the present motion for judgment on the pleadings  and motion to strike  concern only those particular claims. The Court will first address the motion to strike and will then address the Rule 12(c) motion.
B. Motion to Strike
In ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must determine upon a review limited to the pleadings whether the plaintiff has stated a valid claim for relief. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "If, on a motion under Rule.. 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
Kmart has attached to its response a flooding evaluation report by EFI Global. Kroger correctly states in its motion to strike that this report contains factual matters outside the pleadings, and thus would not be properly considered on a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court finds that Kroger's motion to strike  is well taken: the flooding evaluation report by EFI Global, as well as any references to or statements of reliance on said report, shall be stricken from Kmart's response to the Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Having addressed this preliminary matter, the Court now turns to the Rule 12(c) motion.
C. Rule 12(c) Standard
"After the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion is governed by the same standards as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion-that is, that the court must determine upon a review of the pleadings whether the plaintiff has stated a valid claim for relief. Brown v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 472 F.Appx. 302, 303 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 440 n.8 (5th Cir. 2000)). To survive dismissal, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)); see Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit has explained the Iqbal/Twombly standard as follows:
In order for a claim to be plausible at the pleading stage, the complaint need not strike the reviewing court as probably meritorious, but it must raise more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has violated the law as alleged. Furthermore, the factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. In determining whether a complaint states a claim that is plausible on its face, the court draws on its judicial experience and common sense.
Oceanic Exploration Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. ZOC, 352 F.Appx. 945, 950 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Although the Court need not "accept as true conclusory allegations or unwarranted deductions of fact, " see Great Plains Trust Co., 313 F.3d at 313, dismissal is appropriate on a motion for judgment on the pleadings only "when it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief, " id. at 302-03. "A motion brought pursuant to [Rule] 12(c) is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1367, at 509-10 (1990)). "Pleadings should be construed liberally, and judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if there are no disputed issues of fact and only questions of law remain." Hughes v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417, 420 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998)). "The issue is not whether the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, but whether they are entitled to offer evidence to support their claims." Ferrer v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007).
D. Discussion and Analysis
Kroger maintains in its motion for judgment on the pleadings  that Kmart's claims against it should be dismissed, because the pleadings indicate that Kmart can prove no set of facts in support of its claims. Kmart's complaint presents three basic theories of negligence against Kroger. Kmart alleges that Kroger (1) improperly remained in the floodway; (2) participated in securing an improperly granted Letter of Map Revision ("LOMR"), which allowed the Corinth Kroger store to improperly remain in the floodway; and (3) otherwise failed to take necessary steps to prevent harm to Kmart due to Kroger's presence in the floodway. Kmart further alleges that these acts and omissions caused the Corinth Kmart store to sustain extensive flood damage. Kmart avers that Kroger's presence in the floodway on March 1, 2010 "caused a displacement of water and rise in the water level" and "altered the water flow from standing water to a rushing, forceful water flow, " both of which resulted in extensive flood damages to the Kmart store. Kmart's ...