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Carter v. State

December 08, 1998

CEDRIC CARTER APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE



Before Thomas, P.j., Diaz, And Southwick, JJ.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Southwick, J.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: January23, 1998

TRIAL JUDGE: HON. KEITH STARRETT

COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PIKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF

TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: 01/23/1998: POST CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF DENIED

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED

¶1. Cedric Carter appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. We find no error and affirm.

¶2. On July 1, 1994, Carter pled guilty to manslaughter. He was given the statutory maximum sentence of twenty years, but with six months suspended and probation for five years. On January 21, 1998, Carter filed a post-conviction relief motion alleging that his sentence was in effect one for twenty-five years, which was illegal because it was greater than the statutory maximum. The circuit court disagreed and found that the sentence was proper and also that the motion was time-barred.

ANALYSIS

¶3. Carter filed his motion for post-conviction relief more than three years after his conviction. Motions under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act must be made within three years after entry of judgment of conviction in the case of a guilty plea. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 1994). The circuit court made entry of judgment in Carter's case on July 1, 1994, and Carter filed his post-conviction relief motion on January 21, 1998. There are three exceptions to the time-bar: (1) intervening court decisions that would have likely affected conviction or sentencing, (2) newly discovered evidence, and (3) a sentence that has expired or an unlawful revocation of probation, parole, or conditional release. Id.; see also Jones v. State, 700 So. 2d 631, 632 (Miss. 1997). In addition, if a fundamental constitutional right is involved, such as a sentence beyond the statutory maximum, the limitation period is irrelevant. Luckett v. State, 582 So. 2d 428, 430 (Miss. 1991). It is under this last exception that Carter argues his claim falls.

¶4. This sentence requires Carter to serve nineteen and one-half years in prison. For five years of probation that follows, Carter would be subject to various restrictions and to the potential that probation would be revoked and the final six months would then have to be served. From Carter's viewpoint, if probation is not revoked this is a twenty-four and a half-year sentence; if probation is revoked at the end of the five years, it is a twenty-five year sentence. Either way this violates the statutory maximum for his crime of twenty years.

¶5. By only suspending the last six months of the sentence, it would appear that the circuit court was attempting to maximize State supervision of Carter by joining a near-maximum for time served in prison with the maximum period for probation. Whether such a sentence is valid requires examining the statutes regarding probation. One statute, which has since been changed in other respects but not this, stated that if part of a sentence was suspended, the maximum period for probation was five years. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-37 (Rev. 1993). Reporting obligations and other terms of the probation could be imposed. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-35 (Rev. 1993).

¶6. The only part of the probation statutes that might be an explicit reference to the present issue is that "[n]o part of the time that one is on probation shall be considered as any part of the time that he shall be sentenced to serve." Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-37. That language might be referring to the specific question here, namely, that a probation period has no correlation to the years that a felon is sentenced to serve and that the total of the two periods may be longer than the maximum sentence. The more logical interpretation, though, is that the language concerns the new sentence that is to be imposed after probation is revoked. We reach that Conclusion because the reference is to the sentence that "shall be" imposed, which reasonably means a sentence that arises after probation. For a probation violation, the trial court may revoke any part of the originally suspended sentence or "may impose any part of the sentence which might have been imposed at the time of conviction." Id. ...


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