BEFORE HAWKINS, P.J.; ROBERTSON AND GRIFFIN, JJ.
ROBERTSON, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
R. T., appeals a youth court adjudication that he is a delinquent child following which he was committed to Oakley Training School. Though insufficient as a matter of law to establish the underlying offense of attempted rape, the evidence supports an adjudication that R. T. committed a simple assault. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.
R.T. was born on September 19, 1968. On June 18, 1985, a petition was filed in the Youth Court of Tishomingo County charging that R.T. was a delinquent child in that he did on or about the 31st day of May, 1985, in this County and State commit an assault upon [R.E.] with a knife and attempt forcibly and against her will to rape, ravish and carnally know the said [R.E.], but he, the said R.T. failed in the commission of said offense.
The statute or statutes upon which the charges were based were not identified. *fn1
The evidence need only be summarized. On Friday afternoon, May 31, 1985, R.T. accosted one R.E. at her home in the middle of the afternoon. He had a medium-sized pocket knife. R.T. forcibly took R.E. behind a woodpile in the backyard, and pushed her to the ground. When R.E. resisted, R.T. told her he was going to tie her arms behind her back with his shirt, but he didn't.
I kept saying all the time that I wouldn't say anything if he'd just leave me alone. And he finally, he just quit. He sat up and just quit and put the knife right beside him on the ground. And he said he didn't know why he was doing this, that he had problems. And I told him, . . . if you'll
work his [sic] problems out, I wouldn't say anything . . . He finally just got up and got the knife and took off.
(d) in petitions alleging delinquency, a citation of the statute or ordinance which the child is alleged to have violated. Error in or omission of the citation shall not be grounds for dismissing the petition or for reversal of the adjudication based thereon if the error or omission did not mislead the child to his prejudice.
The fact that the instant youth court petition failed to state the statute or ordinance R.T. is said to have violated is not fatal, for we find without serious doubt that R.T. and his attorney were well aware of the nature of the charges. On the other hand, we strongly urge youth court prosecutors and youth courts to take seriously the statutory directive and include in their petitions" a citation of the statute or ordinance which the child is alleged to have violated. "Assuming R.T. at one point had the proverbial gleam in the eye, he plucked it in time. Without contradiction, R.T. voluntarily stopped short. Neither did R.E.'s resistance prevent her rape, nor was there any independent intervening cause. The facts are not such that the Youth Court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that R.T. was guilty of attempted rape, an offense defined in this state by a combined reading of Miss. Code Ann. 97-3-65 (2) and 97-1-7 (Supp. 1987). See generally Clemons v. State, 470 So.2d 653 (Miss. 1985); Harden v. State, 465 So.2d 321, 323-26 (Miss. 1985); West v. State, 437 So.2d 1212, 1214 (Miss. 1983); In Interest of M.R.L., 488 So.2d 788, 791 (Miss. 1986).
This is not to say that R.T. committed no criminal act. The evidence establishes rather convincingly that R.T. on May 31, 1985, committed a simple assault upon R.E. See Miss. Code Ann. 97-3-7 (1) (Supp. 1987). In this setting simple assault is a lesser-included offense to the charge of attempted rape. Armstead v. State, 503 So.2d 281, 285-86 (Miss. 1987).
Under the circumstances, so much of the adjudication below as is predicated upon a finding that R.T. committed the offense of attempted rape is reversed and rendered. On the other hand, the Youth Court necessarily found all of those ultimate facts sufficient to undergird an adjudication that R.T. was guilty of simple assault. We convert the adjudication into one that R.T. is guilty of simple assault. See Craig v. ...