were necessarily incorrect, it does indicate that the textbook met certain other criteria in the academic community. This leads the court to find that other, nonjustifiable factors influenced the committee's rejection of the textbook.
II. Conclusions of Law.
A. Standing to Sue.
Before proceeding to the merits of this action, the court must first address itself to the defendants' contention that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue this action, in that they have failed to show the deprivation of a "legally cognizable right". The court notes that this preliminary objection is usually raised in cases which present novel constitutional issues, perhaps because the question of standing "is founded in concern about the proper and properly limited role of the courts in a democratic society." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 354 (1975). The court is not convinced, however, that the issues in this case are particularly novel ones, or that the action extends beyond the court's proper societal role. To put it as simply as possible, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants' conduct deprived them of certain fundamental rights which are constitutionally guaranteed. On that basis, they assert that they have a direct interest in the outcome of this litigation, an interest which entitles them "to have the court decide the merits of the dispute . . .." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S. Ct. at 2205, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 354.
The requisite standing to maintain an action can only be "demonstrated by a plaintiff who has a personal interest in the outcome of the controversy, . . ." Finch v. Mississippi State Medical Ass'n. Inc., 585 F.2d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 1978). This question of "personal interest" or "personal stake" in the outcome is generally determined through the analysis of two separate requirements: (1) whether or not there has been an "injury in fact"; and (2) whether or not "the interest sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1206 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 562 F.2d 1257 (1977), cert. denied sub. nom., 435 U.S. 968, 98 S. Ct. 1606, 56 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1978). The first requirement or criterion relates directly to whether or not the plaintiff's interest is sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirement that the action be a "case of controversy." See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-113, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 2873, 49 L. Ed. 2d 826, 832 (1976). The second requirement as interpreted most recently by the Supreme Court, is actually a question of causation. In other words, there must be "a "fairly traceable' causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S. Ct. 2620, 2630, 57 L. Ed. 2d 595, 610 (1978). See also, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977). This court must determine, therefore, whether the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient "injury in fact", and whether there is some "causal connection" between the injury and the regulatory procedure which plaintiffs challenge.
In making this analysis, however, the court notes that it does not pass on the merits of the action at this point. Bearing in mind the distinction between standing and the merits of a particular cause of action, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 60 L. Ed. 2d 846, 859 n.18 (1979), the court finds that the plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient injury or personal stake "that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1924, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 460 (1976). It is arguable that the plaintiffs have suffered an injury as the result of the impairment of their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. As for the plaintiffs Loewen and Sallis, the editors of the textbook, the committee's action has effectively prevented the distribution of the book within Mississippi. A finding that the state's regulation impairs sales or distribution is sufficient to confer standing on those adversely affected. Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 n.6, 83 S. Ct. 631, 636 n.6, 9 L. Ed. 2d 584, 589 (1963). Similarly, to the extent that the state's authority to regulate local curricula may be subject to constitutional restraints, the plaintiff school district, school superintendents and teachers may assert their first amendment rights to protect academic freedom. Any restraint on that freedom is a palpable injury for which they may seek redress. See Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D.Ala.1970), citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311 (1957). The plaintiff students and parents also have protected rights under the first amendment to receive useful information and to have a voice in the direction of a student's education. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1924); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923); Right to Read Defense Committee of Chelsea v. School Committee, 454 F. Supp. 703 (D.Mass.1978).
As to the second prong of the standing issue, the plaintiffs have also alleged a sufficiently "traceable" causal connection between the purported injury to their protected rights, and the defendants' conduct. To borrow a phrase from the law of torts, the defendants' conduct is the sine qua non of the alleged injury; but for the rejection of the Loewen and Sallis textbook, the plaintiffs would not be "proper proponents of the particular legal rights on which they base their suit." Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, at 112-113, 96 S. Ct. 2868, at 2873, 49 L. Ed. 2d 826, at 832 (1976). The court concludes, therefore, that the plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, and that they are entitled to have this court decide the merits of their dispute.
B. Plaintiffs' Cause of Action: 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983.
The plaintiffs claim that the action of the rating committee in refusing to recommend Mississippi: Conflict and Change, and the action of the Board in ratifying that decision, deprived the plaintiffs of their rights secured by the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. For such violations of these guaranteed rights, a cause of action has been created in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and this court has jurisdiction to hear such a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) & (4). Of course, not every action by state officials which adversely affects a person's interests will give rise to a cause of action under § 1983. The "state action" required by the section must rise to the level of a violation of specific constitutional guarantees. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S. Ct. 992, 43 L. Ed. 2d 214, rehearing denied, 421 U.S. 921, 95 S. Ct. 1589, 43 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1975). The prerequisites to liability under § 1983 are twofold: (1) The plaintiff must prove that the defendant deprived him of his rights secured by either the Constitution or the laws of the United States; and (2) the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted under color of state law. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970); Downing v. Arnold, 461 F. Supp. 54 (D.N.H.1978); Reilly v. Leonard, 459 F. Supp. 291 (D.Conn.1978). It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove that the defendant acted with the specific intent to deprive plaintiff of his rights, for as the Supreme Court has stated, § 1983 "should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S. Ct. 473, 484, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492, 505 (1961). Of course, in alleging under § 1983 that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of equal protection of the laws through racially discriminatory practices, the plaintiff must prove "discriminatory intent" on the part of the defendant. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1976). The Fifth Circuit, however, has reconciled these two cases with Monroe and has found that the two principles are not inconsistent:
(W)e do not read Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights as banishing from the law of racial and ethnic discrimination that venerable common law tort principle that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his actions. When the official actions challenged as discriminatory include acts and decisions that do not have a firm basis in well accepted and historically sound non-discriminatory social policy, discriminatory intent may be inferred from the fact that those acts had foreseeable discriminatory consequences.